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Three quarters of all violence against women is perpetrated by domestic partners.  I study both the
economic causes and consequences of domestic violence.  I find that decreases in the male-female
wage gap reduce violence against women, consistent with a household bargaining model. The relationship
between the wage gap and violence suggests that reductions in violence may provide an alternative
explanation for the well-established finding that child health improves when mothers control a greater
share of the household resources.  Using instrumental variable and propsensity score techniques to
control for selection into violent relationships, I find that violence against pregnant women negatively
affects the health of their children at birth.  This work sheds new light on the health production process
as well as observed income gradients in health and suggests that in addition to addressing concerns









I.   Introduction 
Everyday 14 thousand women in the US are battered and four are killed by their intimate 
partners, with poor and disadvantaged women disproportionately affected.  The estimated 
costs of domestic violence in terms of medical care and declines in productivity exceed $5.8 
billion annually (CDC, 2003), prompting former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop to label 
domestic violence “the single most important health issue in the US.”  In this paper I examine 
some of the economic causes and consequence of domestic violence, analyzing both the 
impact of women’s wages on domestic violence and the impact of domestic violence on child 
health.  This work makes two contributions to the existing literature.  First it establishes a 
negative causal relationship between women’s wages and violence. Second, it identifies 
external costs associated with violence against women not previously considered and 
quantified: that the children of women who are the victims of violence suffer worse birth 
outcomes.  Given the importance of birth outcomes in determining adult education and 
income (Black, Devereux and Salvanes, 2007), these results suggest that the higher levels of 
violence against poor women may contribute to the intergenerational transmission of 
economic status.  
Violence and Women’s Wages 
Existing empirical research based on survey data has generally found that women 
with lower wages experience more violence.  However, this work is limited in three respects.  
First, these studies fail to establish a causal relationship between domestic violence and 
women’s wages by, for example, failing to account for the potential for omitted variable bias 
or reverse causality.  Second, these studies focus largely on the woman’s own wage when a 
household bargaining model suggests not only that women’s relative wage matters but that 
potential, not actual, wages determine bargaining power and levels of violence. Third, they 
are based on data from household surveys which are prone to non-random underreporting.   3
To overcome these shortcomings, I employ two strategies.  First, when using 
individual survey data, I instrument for women’s income with characteristics of the local 
labor market conditions. To do so I take advantage of the fact that certain industries have 
traditionally been dominated by women (e.g., services) and others by men (e.g., 
construction).  I create measures of local labor market conditions for men and women based 
on the industrial structure of the county and wage changes in the industries dominant in each 
county.  Based on these measures, I find that as local labor market conditions for women 
improve, violence against them declines. I follow this with an analysis based on a new source 
of data on violence: administrative data on female hospitalization for assault. These data 
represent an improvement over individual level survey data because they do not rely on self-
reports of violence and include the universe of all women in California (roughly 15 million 
individuals).  I find that the improvement in local labor market conditions faced by women 
over the period 1990-2003 explains ten percent of the decline in violence against women 
witnessed over this period.   
These findings are consistent with a simple model of household bargaining in which 
an increase in a woman’s relative income increases her bargaining power and leads to a 
reduction in violence against her.  The findings are inconsistent with models of “male 
backlash” developed by sociologists that predict that as women’s wages increase, violence 
against them increases because men feel their traditional gender role threatened.  They are 
also inconsistent with the model of exposure reduction developed by criminologists that 
predicts that as the labor force participation of women in creases, violence against them may 
decline because women spend less time with their violent partners. I find that the reductions 
in violence are most likely to occur during non-working hours, which is inconsistent with 
exposure reduction.    4
Violence and Child Health  
Based on these findings I explore the impact of violence against women on child 
health at birth.  Previous work based on developing countries has shown that child health 
improves when mothers control a greater share of the household resources (Thomas, 1990).  
This finding has been largely attributed to women’s greater preferences for children and 
increased material investments in them, though there is little empirical support for this 
mechanism.  The research presented here suggests another potential mechanism: reductions 
in violence.  Violence during pregnancy can adversely affect the developing fetus via blunt 
trauma to the maternal abdomen (Silverman et al, 2006).  Using a unique dataset that 
includes birth outcomes for all women in California and admissions to the hospital for an 
assault while pregnant, I explore the importance of violence as a mechanism behind the link 
between maternal resources and child well-being.  Using instrumental variable and 
propensity score techniques to account for non-random selection into violent relationships, I 
find that reductions in violence against women result in improved birth outcomes.  These 
results provide evidence of important externalities associated with domestic violence not 
previously quantified. In addition, given that poor women suffer more violence, this work 
sheds new light on observed income gradients in health.    
  The rest of this paper is laid out as follows: in section II I review the existing 
literature on domestic violence, discuss the shortcomings of existing empirical work and 
describe a bargaining model that incorporates violence, in section III I present  the 
analysis of the impact of female income on domestic violence based on individual survey 
data, in section IV I present the analysis of the impact of women’s relative labor market 
conditions on violence using administrative data on hospitalizations, section V contains 
the analysis of the impact of violence on birth outcomes, and section VI concludes.    5
II.  Background on Domestic Violence  
A.  Prevalence of Domestic Violence and Risk Factors 
 Most estimates of domestic violence in the US come from the National Violence 
Against Women (NVAW) survey fielded in 1994.  These data reveal an annual incidence 
of 2 percent, a lifetime incidence of 25 percent and that intimate partners are responsible 
for three fourths of all violence against women over the age of 18 (Tjaden and Thoennes, 
1998).  Disadvantaged women face much higher risks of abuse. Women with income 
below $10,000 annually report rates of domestic violence that are five times those with 
annual income greater than $30,000 (BJS, 1994).    In addition, black women are at 
significantly greater risk of violence and conditional on violence are subject to more 
severe attacks (Rennison and Welchans, 2000).  Also at greater risk are young women 
between the ages of 20 and 34.   
The National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS) is the only survey that has allowed 
tracking over time and findings suggests that the rates of domestic violence against 
women declined by 50 percent between 1993 and 2001.
1   
  
B.  Theories of the Relationship Between Economic Status and Violence 
Most of the existing research on domestic violence has been conducted by 
criminologists and sociologists. Criminologists have developed a theory of the 
relationship between employment and domestic violence referred to as exposure 
reduction. This theory posits that the increase in employment among either men or 
                                                 
1 Intimate partner violence against men has also dropped over this period.  Criminologists have suggested 
that the decline among men may be attributable to declines in the number of women in abusive 
relationships who kill their partners/abusers in defense (Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld, 1999).  
Due to a change in survey design, estimates prior to 1993 are not comparable to those obtained post 1993.    6
women will reduce domestic violence simply by reducing the time partners spend 
together, (Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld, 1999). 
   Two theories prominent in the sociological literature predict that as women’s 
financial independence increases, violence against them should increase.  The first theory 
is one of male backlash against increasing female independence associated with their 
increased employment and personal income.  According to Macmillan and Gartner 
(1999), a wife’s independence “signifies a challenge to culturally prescribed norm of 
male dominance and female dependence.  Where a man lacks this sign of dominance, 
violence may be a means of reinstating his authority over his wife.”  The second theory 
derives from exchange theory and views domestic violence as one of the two sides of a 
reward/punishment approach to influence (Molm, 1989).  Under this scenario, individuals 
possess two sources of power: transferring resources (rewards) and violence 
(punishment).  As a husband’s ability to influence his wife’s behavior by transferring 
resources (rewards) diminishes when his income decreases relative to hers, he is more 
likely to rely on punishment which may include violence.   
Theories of male backlash and exchange theory which predict that increases in 
women’s wages lead to an increase in violence are problematic because they ignore the 
individually rational constraint faced by women in abusive relationships.  That is, as their 
income increases, women are more likely to end the partnership if transfers decline and 
abuse continues or escalates. 
Economic theories of household bargaining are consistent with the individually 
rational constraint but generally do not incorporate violence.  Exceptions are Bloch and 
Rao (2002) and Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997).  Bloch and Rao (2002) incorporates 
asymmetric information and signaling in a model of noncooperative bargaining to explain   7
why a woman from a wealthy family in India is subject to greater violence by her 
husband in an effort to extract more resources from her family. This model, however, 
does not fit the experience of women in the US.  Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997) present 
a particular case of a non-cooperative model of domestic violence in which men have all 
the bargaining power.    
In the appendix I present a model that is a generalization of the model of Farmer 
and Tiefenthaler (1997) and states some of the assumptions crucial for the result that are 
not indicated in Farmer and Tiefenthaler (1997). The model is a straightforward Nash 
bargaining model in which utility is a function of consumption and violence with the 
man’s utility is increasing in violence and the woman’s decreasing in violence.  The 
results illustrate how changes in a woman’s wage affect her bargaining power and thus 
the level of violence by affecting her outside option.  Two implications of the model are 
worth highlighting as they inform the empirical analysis.  First, relative wages matter, not 
absolute wages.  Second, it is the potential wage that determines one’s outside option, not 
necessarily the actual wage (Pollak, 2005).
2   This suggests that one should focus on 
relative labor market conditions for women, not necessarily actual wages in this analysis.  
This also implies that improving labor market conditions for women will decrease 
violence even in households where women do not work.   
In the next section I review the results of previous empirical work that examines 
the relationship between income and violence.  
 
  
                                                 
2 This is due to the fact that a woman’s earnings at her threat point determine her bargaining power and 
earnings at the bargaining equilibrium do not necessarily equal earnings at the threat point.  Pollak (2005) 
provides an example of a married woman who does not work (zero wages) at the cooperative equilibrium 
but who would work in the event of the dissolution of the marriage.      8
C. Previous Empirical Work on the Relationship Between Wages and Violence 
Existing empirical research based on survey data has generally found that women 
with lower wages experience more violence.  However, this work is limited in three respects.  
First, these studies fail to establish a causal relationship between domestic violence and 
women’s wages by, for example, failing to account for omitted variable bias or reverse 
causality.  Second, these studies focus largely on the woman’s own wage when a household 
bargaining model suggests not only that the relative wage matters but that potential, not 
actual, wages determine bargaining power and levels of violence. Third, they are based on 
data from household surveys which are prone to non-random underreporting (Ellsberg, 
2001). 
  The pioneering study of the relationship between women’s income and violence is 
Gelles (1976) who finds that the fewer resources a woman has, the less likely she is to 
leave an abusive relationship.  More recently, Bowlus and Seitz (2005) using structural 
estimation methods find that female employment has a large negative and significant 
effect on abuse.   Interestingly, they also find that men are more responsive to policies 
designed to reduce the gains to repeat abuse than women are to policies reducing the cost 
of leaving violent marriages.  Other work includes Macmillan and Gartner 91999) and 
Dugan, Nagin and Rosenfeld (1999).  
  Some studies have utilized panel data on women who were victims of domestic 
violence to examine the impact of changes in income over time on violence for a given 
woman  (Tauchen, Witte and Long, 1991; Farmer and Tiefenthaler, 1997).  While this 
approach enables one to overcome the potential for omitted variable bias (assuming it is 
time-invariant), it does not rule out the potential for reverse causality -  that declines in 
abuse may increase a woman’s productivity and earnings.   9
  The only experimental evidence on the impact of women’s economic status on 
domestic violence comes from a randomized intervention that combined microfinance 
with an education program among South African women.  Women randomized to receive 
the intervention experienced a 55 percent drop in domestic violence relative to the control 
group (Pronyk et al, 2006).   
Other related work on domestic violence more generally but not the relationship 
between violence and income include Stevenson and Wolfers (2003), Dee (2003), Fertig, 
Garfinkel and Mclanahan (2004), and Nou and Timmins (2005).   
  In the next section, I estimate the impact of women’s resource on violence using 
individual survey data.  Because of the limitations inherent in an analysis based on 
individual survey data, I complement it with an analysis of the impact of labor market 
conditions on violence against women using aggregate administrative data, overcoming 
some of the shortcomings of individual survey data. 
   
III.  Analysis of the Impact of Income on Domestic Violence: Individual 
Survey Data  
 
A. Data and Empirical Methods  
Using individual level survey data from the California Women’s Health Survey 
(CWHS) 1998-2003, I estimate the impact of women’s personal income on the 
probability of reporting any domestic violence. The CWHS is an annual cross sectional 
survey of 4000 California women.  The CWHS includes a question on whether she has 
experienced intimate partner violence in the past year (slapping, hitting, getting beaten 
up, use of a weapon, threatened with a weapon).
3   The survey does not include 
                                                 
3 In 2002, only a single question about experiencing any violence in the past year was included, separate 
questions about the type of violence were not included. As a result, the estimate of the proportion of 
women reporting any violence in 2002 is roughly half of what it is in 2001 and 2003.  All analyses include   10
information about the resources of her male partner so that one cannot estimate the 
impact of women’s relative income (as predicted by theory) but only the absolute level of 
her income.  In addition, women’s personal income in the CWHS is not provided as a 
continuous measure but rather as ten ranges from less than $10,000 a year to more than 
$100,000 per year, in increments of $10,000.  To create a continuous measure each 
woman was assigned the midpoint of the range of income she reported, introducing 
substantial measurement error and attenuation bias which instrumental variable methods 
can reduce. 
Characteristics of women in the CWHS reporting abuse and trends in abuse over this 
period are consistent with other survey data (see section IIA).  The share of women 
reporting domestic violence declined from 6.2 percent in 1998 to 4.7 percent by 2003, a 
decline of 25 percent over five years (Appendix Table 1).  In the second panel of the table 
is the probability of violence and mean annual income by race, education, age and marital 
status.   Violence is highest among Black women (7.2 percent) and lowest among Asian 
women (3.5 percent).  Violence varies inversely with education: 7.2 percent of high 
school drop outs report violence as opposed to 2.9 percent of college graduates. Violence 
also declines with age.   The correlation between race, education, age and violence 
underscore the importance of controlling for omitted variables that may bias estimates of 
the impact of income on violence.     
To estimate the impact of income on domestic violence in individual data, the 
following is estimated with a probit model: 
DV  = δ1INCOME + δ2RACE + δ3AGE +  δ4EDUCATION +        (1) 
   γYEAR + θCOUNTY  + ε 
                                                                                                                                                 
year fixed effects and because of this change in question wording were run a second time excluding 2002, 
with no change in the results.    11
DV is an indicator equal to one if she reports that she was the victim of domestic violence 
in the past year.  INCOME is her personal income, RACE is a vector of five race 
dummies (Black, White, Hispanic, Asian and Other), AGE is a vector of  four age 
dummies (<25, 25-30, 31-39, 40-49, 50-64), EDUCATION is a vector of education 
dummies (HS drop out, HS graduate, College), YEAR is a vector of year dummies to 
control for secular trends in violence and COUNTY is a vector of six dummy variables 
for the six largest counties in California (Los Angeles, San Diego, Alameda, Sacramento, 
and Fresno) that represent 45 percent of the sample.
4  The distribution function of the 
error term is a standard normal.  
I instrument for women’s income with a measure of local labor market conditions 
to both overcome the bias generated by the endogeneity of women’s income and to 
account for the fact that potential wages (as reflected in local labor market conditions) 
and not actual wages should affect the level of violence.  To create this measure I take 
advantage of the history of sex-segregation by industry to construct a measure of local 
labor market conditions faced by women that is based on wage changes in industries 
dominated by women.
5  Gender and racial segregation by industry is well-established 
(Bayard et al, 1999; Tomasovik-Devey, 1993).  For example, data for California reveal 
that 72% of service industry employees are women while 90% of those employed in the 
construction industry are men.    
Average annual wages are thus calculated separately by gender and race in each 
county as follows: 
∑ =
j
cyj grcj grcy w w γ         ( 2 )  
                                                 
4 Including dummy variables for each of the 58 counties in California is infeasible given the small sample 
sizes in most counties outside the 6 largest ones.  
5 This assumes an upward sloping labor supply curve.  Fixed costs of migration would give rise to such a 
curve.  The existence of persistent wage differences across local markets supports this assumption.    12
where c indexes county, g gender, r race, y year and j industry. Wcyj is the annual wage in 
industry j in county c year y from the Bureau of Economic Analysis annual survey of 
employers. γgrjc is the proportion of women (or men) with no more than a high school 
degree of a given race working in industry j in county c (from the 1990 census).  I focus 
on the low-skilled as violence is much more prevalent among this group.  This proportion 
is fixed over this period so that changes in the wage do not reflect selective sorting across 
industries over this period.  However, there appears to be very little redistribution 
between 1990 and 2000 (see Appendix Figure 1).  This measure is arguably exogenous as 
it is driven primarily by changes in the demand for labor in industries dominated by 
women relative to men – not by changes in their underlying productivities which might 
independently affect violence.  Similar measures of labor demand were used by Hoynes 
(2000) in her study of the impact of demand conditions on welfare participation among 
low income women in California.
6   
 
B.   Results 
  In Table 1 are probit estimates of equation (1) and marginal effects.  A woman’s 
personal income has a negative and significant effect on the probability of experiencing 
any domestic violence, but the impact is small.  An increase in personal income of 
$10,000 annually, for example, reduces domestic violence by only 2 percent. In contrast, 
the marginal effects of education and age are considerably larger.   
However, as noted previously, it is potential wages, not actual wages, that 
determine one’s bargaining power and the level of violence. For this reason and for issues 
related to endogeneity and measurement error in the income variable, I instrument for 
                                                 
6 Hoynes (2000) uses county-level wages and employment  in the retail and service industries as measures 
of the demand for low-skilled women workers.    13
women’s income using the measure of the local demand for women’s labor defined in 
equation (2).  Estimates from the first stage are presented in Table 2.  The estimated 
coefficient of 52 on female labor market conditions suggests that a 10 percent increase in 
wages paid in industries dominated by women leads to a four percent increase in female 
personal income. The instrumental variable probit results are presented in columns (3) 
and (4) of Table 1.  When instrumented, the impact of a woman’s own income on 
domestic violence increases considerably, as expected – a $10,000 annual increase in her 
own personal income leads to a 21 percent reduction in the probability of violence against 
her (a reduction of 1.1 percentage points on a baseline percentage of 5.3).   
But as previously noted, results based on individual survey data are limited.  To 
overcome these limitations I conduct an analysis based on a new source of administrative 
data on violence described in the next section.  
  
IV.  Analysis of the Impact of Income on Domestic Violence: Administrative 
Data on Hospitalizations 
  
A.  Data 
For the aggregate analysis, I develop an alternative measure of violence: the number of 
women admitted to the hospital for an assault.  This measure is derived from hospital 
discharge data from the state of California for 1990-2003.  These data include external 
cause of injury data for all hospital admissions and medical personnel classify injuries as 
assaults, accidents or self-inflicted injuries.  For each county, I calculate annual race-
specific rates of hospitalization for assault for women age 15-44 for the period 1990-  14
2003.
7  The final dataset consists of a panel of 2261 observations (41 counties x 14 years 
x 4 racial groups).
8  Summary statistics are presented in Appendix Table 2.  
  This measure of violence against women has two drawbacks.  First, it will include 
assaults against women not inflicted by an intimate partner.  To the extent that most 
violence against women is perpetrated by intimates (estimates range from 76 to 87 
percent) and I can control for levels of non-intimate violence in the analysis, I limit any 
bias from such misclassification.
9  A second drawback is that this measure will only 
include those assaults so severe as to require hospitalization (seven percent of injured 
women, according to the NVAW survey).  Thus results based on hospitalizations may not 
be generalizeable to less severe acts of violence. In addition, because black women are 
both more likely to be abused and, conditional on abuse, subject to more severe violence 
they will be over-represented in the hospitalization data.    
 
B. Hospitalization for Assaults 1990 -2003 
The downward trend in domestic violence evident in the CWHS and the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics’ NCV survey is likewise evident in California’s hospitalization data.  
The rate of female hospitalization for assault declines by nearly 70 percent over this 
period from 39 per 100,000 to 12 per 100,000 (Figure 1A).  This trend mirrors trends in 
intimate partner homicide in California derived from death certificates (Figure 1B).  In 
                                                 
7 Rates are calculated by combining these data with data on annual population counts by county, gender, 
race and age provided by the California Department of Finance.   I limit the analysis to women age 15-44 
because evidence based on surveys suggests that domestic violence is most prevalent among young women 
and the assault data reflect this as well.   California is the largest state in the US with a population of 34 
million.  Of the state’s 58 counties, 25 have populations in excess of 250,000 and eight have populations in 
excess of 1 million. 
8 Only the largest 41 counties are identifiable in the census data, and in those counties, some races are not 
well represented (there 35 cells with no observations.) 
9 Estimates from the NVAWS suggest 76 percent while evidence from a medical chart review of pregnant 
women admitted to the hospital for assault and presented by Goodwin and Breen (1990), suggests 87 
percent.   15
addition, many of the risk factors for domestic violence identified in survey data are also 
apparent in the hospital discharge data.  Black women, young women and poor women 
are all at higher risk for domestic violence and are much more likely to be admitted to the 
hospital for an assault than others (see Appendix Table 2). The rate at which women are 
admitted to the hospital for an assault is highly correlated with other measures of 
domestic violence such as arrests for domestic violence (0.77) and intimate partner 
homicide (0.89). 
However, two other factors unrelated to declines in domestic violence could be 
responsible for the downward trend in female hospitalization for assault: declines in 
hospitalization and declines in violent crime.  To explore the former, I display trends in 
hospitalization for assaults and non-assault injuries in Figures 1C and 1D.  Both are 
declining considerably over this period, but hospitalizations for assaults proportionately 
more so.   And to address the possibility that the decline in violent crime over this period 
may be responsible for the trend in female hospitalization for assault, I compare 
hospitalization for assault for males and females over this period in Figure 1E, assuming 
the decline for males captures declining rates of violent crime (Figure 1F). Over this 
period, assaults for males do decline, but at a slower rate (20 percent) compared to 
females (30 percent).  While this suggests that underlying trends in both hospital 
utilization and violent crime explain some of the decline in the measure of domestic 
violence, they do not explain all.  However, this underscores the need to control for such 
underlying trends over this period to identify the effects of the wage ratio on domestic 
violence, a point to which I return in the analysis.  
  
C. Empirical Estimation Strategy   16
The panel structure of the administrative data enables identification of the impact 
of relative wages on domestic violence from changes within each county over time which 
implicitly controls for all differences (observed and unobserved) between counties and 
avoids identification from comparisons across different counties.  The following equation 
is estimated: 
 
DVcry = α + β1WAGERATIOcry + β2UNEMPcy + β3INCcy + β4RACEr +     (3) 
β5VIOLENCEcry + β6LN(IMMIGRATION)cy + β7LN(INCARCERATION)cry  
+ γYEARy + θCOUNTYc+εcry 
 
In this equation, c indexes county, r race and y year.  DV refers to the measures of 
domestic violence derived from the hospitalization data and defined by year, county and 
race (for the base specification this is the hospitalization rate for assaults per 100,000 
women age 15-44).  WAGERATIO is the ratio of female to male earnings within race 
with wages constructed according to equation (2), though alternative measures (the linear 
difference between male and female wages and the log of the wage ratio) are also 
considered.
10  Using wage constructed according to equation (2), the female/male wage 
ratio increases six percentage points between 1990 and 2003 from 0.84 to 0.90. This 
measure of the wage ratio understates the true difference in earnings as it only captures 
wage differences due to industry segregation, failing to capture other differences due to 
occupational segregation, discrimination, differences in labor force participation, or 
differences in skill.  The trend in the earnings ratio from the annual March CPS for low 
                                                 
10 Examining the impact of relative wages within racial groups is justified given that inter-racial 
relationships are still relatively rare over this period: 14% for 18-19 year olds, 12% for 20-21 and 7% for 
34-35 year olds (Joyner and Kao, 2005).   17
skilled (a high school degree or less) in California follows a similar upward trend over 
this period rising from 0.52 to 0.62.   
Additional covariates that capture changes in the business cycle and trends in 
violent crime more generally are also included. UNEMP is the annual unemployment rate 
in the county and INC is per capita income in the county and year.  These are included so 
that the impact of relative income can be identified separately from the impact of general 
economic conditions in the county.  RACE is a vector of race dummies (Black, Asian and 
Hispanic – white is excluded) and their inclusion controls for the substantial differences 
in rates of violence across races. VIOLENCE is the non-intimate homicide rate by 
county, race and year and is included to control for trends in underlying violence.  
  To control for changes in the supply of low-skilled labor that may affect the wage 
ratio, I include measures of the number of new immigrants and the incarceration rate: 
IMMIGRATION is the number of immigrants in the county calculated by the California 
Department of Finance and INCARCERATION is the flow of newly incarcerated men 
(those incarcerated – those released).
 11  Finally, year and county fixed effects are 
included to control for any unobserved fixed differences between counties and state-wide 
secular trends in domestic violence, respectively.  The latter will control for all state-wide 
policy changes such as welfare reform, expansions in the EITC, changes in Medicaid 
eligibility or state laws regarding the prosecution of domestic violence that may affect 
rates of domestic violence.  All regressions are weighted by cell size (female population 
15-44 by race, county and year). 
  I argue that the weighted average female/male earnings ratio is a good measure of 
the local labor market conditions based by women relative to men as it primarily reflects 
                                                 
11 I take the natural log of these two variables due to the difficulty defining appropriate denominators to 
calculate a ratio.   18
changes in the demand for female and male unskilled labor and not the underlying 
productivities of females and males in a particular labor market that may independently 
affect rates of violence.  However, to control for other possible supply-side factors that 
could influence this ratio (in addition to the influx of immigrants and incarceration rates), 
I reconstruct the wage ratio to further limit the possibility that the ratio reflects changes in 
underlying productivities of women over this period.  The alternative measure of wage is 
average wage for women (or men) in a given county*year*race cell constructed as above 
except that the industry wage is based on the average industry wage in the rest of the state 
(all counties except the given county).   
∑ − =
j
cyj grcj grcy w w γ       ( 4 )  
Constructed in this way, the measure does not reflect changes in industry wages that 
might be caused by changes in the county’s labor supply.  Identifying variation comes 
solely from the industrial composition of each county: counties with many workers in 
industries characterized by large (state-wide) wage growth will experience larger 
increases in average wages than counties with workers in low wage-growth industries.  
Identification does not arise from variation in industry-level wage growth across counties.   
This measure is similar to other exogenous measures of demand for labor developed by 
Bartik (1991) and used by Blanchard and Katz (1992) and Autor and Duggan (2003).  
    
D. Results 
 
  Estimates of equation (3) are presented in Table 3. In the first panel of the table 
are estimates of the impact of the female/male wage ratio on multiple measures of 
assault. The coefficient estimate in the first panel of -28.43 suggests that the increase in   19
the wage ratio from 0.84 to 0.90 over this period led to a decline in the rate of female 
hospitalizations of 4.4 percent.  Female hospitalizations for assaults declined by 70 
percent over this period, suggesting that the increase in the wage ratio accounts for 6.3 
percent of this decline.   
  However, as previously noted the number of women admitted to the hospital for 
an assault also captures changes in patterns of hospitalization over this period (see Figure 
1C).  To account for this, I present estimates of the impact of the wage ratio on violence 
as measured by the share of all hospitalizations for injuries that are the result of an assault 
in column (2).  This measure also mitigates against potential measurement error 
introduced by imprecision of the population counts.  Again, as the wage ratio increases, 
the proportion of hospitalizations due to an assault declines.  The observed increase in the 
wage ratio explains roughly 6.6 percent of the decline.  
To address the concern that the decline in hospitalizations for assaults also reflects 
dramatic declines in violent crime more generally over this period (Figures 1E and 1F), I 
further refine the measure of violence.   I assume that the decline in violent crime more 
generally over this period is reflected in the decline in hospitalizations for assaults among 
males.  In column (3) of Table 4 I include the rate of male hospitalizations for assaults as 
a regressor. In column (4) I redefine the measure of domestic violence to be the share of 
all injuries that results from an assault for women relative to the same measure for males.   
This measures declines from 0.31 to 0.21 over this period, or 30 percent, very similar to 
the 27 percent decline in intimate partner homicides among women in California 
witnessed over this period. The regression coefficient of -0.173 in column (4) suggests 
that the decline in the wage gap of six percentage points explains ten percent of the 
decline in domestic violence witnessed over this period.  In column (5) are estimates of   20
the impact of the wage ratio on the ratio of female assaults to male assaults, controlling 
for the ratio of female non-assault injuries to male non-assault injuries.   The estimate is 
very similar to that in column (4).  
 
E.   Robustness 
Redefining the Wage Gap 
  To explore whether the results are sensitive to the definition of the wage gap, I 
redefine the wage gap to be the log of the wage ratio and the linear difference of male and 
female wages in the second and third panels of Table 4, respectively. Regardless of the 
way that the wage difference is measured, the results are qualitatively the same: closing 
the wage gap leads to a decline in the rate of female hospitalization for assaults.
12 
Violence against Men  
To compare how the wage ratio affects female assaults compared to male assaults, 
I redefine the outcome measure to be the natural log of assaults.  In the first column of 
Table 4A, I present estimates of the impact of the wage gap on the natural log of female 
hospitalizations for assault, and in the second column I do the same for the natural log of 
male assaults.  For these regressions, because of small cell with zero hospitalizations for 
assault, I restrict the analysis to cells with at least 15,000 women (or men). These results 
suggest that a six percentage point increase in the female/male wage gap would lead to a 
7.8 percent decline in female hospitalizations for assault but only a 2.2 percent decline in 
male hospitalizations for assault.
13  In the third column, I present the results of a 
regression of the impact of the wage gap on female hospitalizations controlling for male 
                                                 
12 When male and female wages are entered separately, women’s wages reduce the rate of female assaults 
(coefficient -.161 that is statistically significantly different from 0 at the 1 percent level)  while male 
assaults have a positive but insignificant effect on assaults (coefficient of .106). 
13 The 2.2 percent decline among men may reflect reductions in the number of women in battering 
relationships who assault their male partners in self-defense as suggested by some criminologists.    21
hospitalizations.  The results suggest that an increase in the wage gap of 6 percentage 
points leads to a 6.7 percent decline in violence. 
Zipcode-Level Analysis   
One possible reason why we find that as increase in women’s wages is associated 
with declines in violence is that as women earn more, they move to “safer” 
neighborhoods and thus are less likely to be the victim of crime. To rule this possibility 
out, I create zipcode level measures of violence and examine the impact of changes in the 
wage ratio on violence within zipcode.  Because population by race, gender and age is 
not available at the zipcode level (except from the decennial census), the outcome 
examined is the ratio of female assaults to male assaults (as in column 5 of Table 4).   
The results (Table 4B) are not directly comparable to the previous analysis 
because the five digit zipcode is only available for years 1991 and 1994-2000 in the 
hospital discharge data and is missing for 25,000 discharges.  This non-random sampling 
results in important differences in the outcome measure: for the zipcode sample, the ratio 
of female to male assault is .076 whereas in the full sample the ratio is .131 and the 
decline in violence is also smaller, from .094 to .061. Thus, even though the coefficient 
estimates are one third the value of estimates based on the full sample, the interpretation 
is similar: the increase in the ratio of female to male wages still explains ten percent of 
the decline in violence over this period.   
Falsification Tests  
I also estimate the impact of the wage difference on two outcomes for which I 
expect small or no effects: female hospitalizations for attempted suicide and car crashes.    22
There does not appear to be any significant effect of the wage ratio on either of these 
measures.
14  
Exogeneity of Wages 
  To address the possibility that the measures of the female- male wage gap may 
not just reflect an increase in demand for female labor but an increase in the productivity 
of local area women which may be correlated with propensity for domestic violence, I 
use county level wage gap as calculated in equation (4).  Recall that this measure is based 
on the industrial structure of the county, but the wage in the rest of the state (excluding 
the county).  These estimates are presented in Table 5.  The estimates are precise and 
similar to the estimates based on the previous county-level measure of wages.   
Exposure Reduction 
The findings thus far provide evidence in favor of a marital bargaining model in 
which an increase in women’s relative wage increases her bargaining power, thereby 
decreasing violence against her.  However, these findings do not rule out the possibility 
of an alternative explanation - exposure reduction.  Because an increase in women’s 
wages is likely to be accompanied by an increase in female employment, finding that 
violence falls as wages rise may be evidence of either a bargaining story or exposure 
reduction.  In order to test whether exposure reduction is responsible for these findings, I 
estimate the impact of changes in the wage ratio on assaults that occurred during the 
weekday vs. the weekend.  If exposure reduction explains the findings then I should see a 
larger decrease in assaults during the weekday than the weekend. Only 5 years of data 
(1990, 1992, 1993, 1995 and 1996) include information on day of week of admission and 
are used for this analysis.   
                                                 
14 The coefficient estimate for suicide is 0.0083 with a standard error of 0.0152; the coefficient estimate on 
car crashes is -0.0067 with a standard error of 0.0199.    23
In Table 6 I present estimates based on these five years of data.  In the first two 
columns I present estimates of the impact of the female/male wage ratio on the share of 
hospitalizations for an injury that are the result of an assault on weekends (column 1) and 
weekdays (column 2).  In the next two columns I present estimates of the impact of the 
linear difference in wage rates.   Most of the decline in violence resulting from an 
increase in the wage ratio occurs during the weekend, which I argue is inconsistent with 
the exposure reduction hypothesis. 
Based on the finding that an increase in women’s relative wages reduces violence 
against her, I revisit previous work establishing a positive relationship between women’s 
share of household resources and child health and well-being.  While previous work has 
largely assumed that this relationship is attributable to increases in women’s material 
investment in children, in the next section I explore whether an alternative mechanism 
(reductions in violence) may also play a role. 
    
V. Women’s Wages, Violence and Child Health  
A. Background 
A marital bargaining model that incorporates children yields important 
predictions regarding women’s income and the allocation of household resources to 
children.  In bargaining models, if mothers exert stronger preferences for their children 
than do fathers, then as women’s income (and bargaining power) increase, household 
allocations to children should likewise increase.  Previous empirical work on intra-
household allocation has largely supported bargaining models over common preference 
models.  Seminal work by Thomas (1990) based on survey data from Brazil found that 
unearned income in the hands of a mother has a bigger effect on her family’s health than   24
income under the control of a father. The positive relationship is often attributed to 
increased expenditures on children:  given equal increases in maternal and paternal 
income, the former results in larger expenditures on children than the latter.  More recent 
work by Duflo (2000) found that an increase in pension payments among women in 
South African households led to improvements in the health of girls in the household (as 
measured by height and weight for height), but not boys.  In contrast, an increase in 
pension payments among men did not have any affect on the health of children.   
  The mechanism behind this relationship, however, is not well-established. 
Previous work linking the distribution of resources in the household to improvements in 
child health often assumes that an increase in material investment is responsible.  Some 
evidence that a reallocation of resources from the father to the mother results in an 
increase in material investments in children is provided by Lundberg, Pollak and Wales 
(1997).  They find, based on data from the UK, that an exogenous increase in maternal 
income leads to an increase in expenditures on women and children’s clothing.  
  The relationship between women’s relative resources and violence established in 
the first part of this paper, however, suggests that reductions in violence provide an 
additional explanation for why an increase in women’s relative income results in 
improved child outcomes.  This mechanism has not previously been considered.  In the 
rest of this paper I explore the relationship between violence and birth outcomes and 
provide the first estimates of a causal relationship.    
 
B. Previous Literature on Violence and Birth Outcomes 
Previous studies have provided estimates of the prevalence of domestic violence 
among pregnant women in the US that range from 0.9% to 20.1% (Gazmararian, et al   25
1996).
15 A number of studies have found that violence often initiates or escalates during 
pregnancy (Stewart and Cecutti, 1993; Helton, McFarlane and Anderson, 1987; Amaro, 
Fried, Cabral and Zuckerman, 1990).  Psychologists have offered one possible 
explanation for the increase in violence during pregnancy: sexual jealousy inspired by the 
uncertainty of paternity. In an interview of 258 men convicted of spouse abuse, Burch 
and Gallup (2004) found that the frequency and severity of abuse directed toward 
pregnant partners was double that directed toward partners who were not pregnant and 
that sexual jealousy was also greater for men with pregnant partners.  
  Medical studies have documented a negative correlation between domestic abuse 
during pregnancy and birth outcomes. Valladeras (2002) found that 22 percent of mothers 
with low birth weight (LBW) infants experienced physical abuse as opposed to five 
percent of full weight infants, controlling for potential confounders such as age, parity, 
socio-economic status and smoking.  In a meta-analysis of eight studies, Murphy el al 
(2001) found that women who reported abuse during pregnancy were more likely than 
nonabused women to give birth to a baby with LBW (OR 1.4).  
Violence affects pregnancy outcomes via multiple mechanisms. Abuse resulting 
in blunt trauma to the maternal abdomen can cause abruptio placentae, fetal fractures, 
rupture of the maternal uterus, liver, spleen and antepartum hemorrhage.  Non-abdominal 
trauma can also cause uterine contractions, premature rupture of membranes and 
infection.  Finally, abuse may also lead to the exacerbation of chronic illnesses such as 
hypertension, diabetes or asthma which can negatively affect the fetus.    
                                                 
15 Examples include Hillard (1985) who found that 3.9 % of 742 prenatal women reported abuse during 
pregnancy; Helton, McFarland and Anderson (1987) found that 8% of 290 pregnant women reported 
violence.  Berenson, Stiglich, Wilkinson and Anderson (1991) found that 5.5% reported abuse during the 
current pregnancy and in a postpartum sample of 488 women, Campbell, Poland, Waller and Ager (1992) 
found that 8.3% of the women reported abuse during the pregnancy.     26
While biological pathways linking violence to poor birth outcomes exist, previous 
studies have not effectively isolated the impact of violence on birth outcomes from other 
maternal characteristics such as poverty and risk taking behavior (smoking, drinking) that 
are correlated with both violence and birth outcomes.  I use propensity score and non-
linear instrumental variable methods to establish the first causal estimate of the impact of 
violence on low birth weight. 
 
C. Data on Violence during Pregnancy and Birth Outcomes 
To estimate the impact of violence on birth outcomes I use a unique dataset that 
links maternal hospitalizations in the nine months prior to birth with detailed natality data 
that includes information on birth outcomes from California for the period 1991-2002 
(excluding 1998).   
Of the more than 5 million births over this period, only 1656 women were 
admitted to the hospital for an assault while pregnant – roughly 3 per 100,000.  However, 
the rate is much higher among disadvantaged women:  50 per 100,000 for those on 
Medicaid and 164 per 100,000 black women.  Sample means for these data presented in 
Table 7 columns (1) and (2) illustrate how women who are admitted to the hospital for an 
assault are more likely to suffer worse birth outcomes and are more likely to come from 
disadvantaged backgrounds (poorer, less educated, younger and more likely to be black) 
and engage in risky behavior such as using drugs and smoking which may independently 
affect birth outcomes.
16  In columns 3 and 4 of Table 7 are average birth outcomes and 
maternal/paternal characteristics of women who suffered unintentional injuries and car 
crashes.  These women suffer worse birth outcomes than women with no injuries, but not 
                                                 
16 Smoking and drinking variables are under-reported and measured with considerable error in the 
California natality data because unlike most states, California only requires reporting if the behavior 
resulted in a complication.    27
as bad as those who have been assaulted.  In addition, they are not nearly as 
disadvantaged as victims of assault, suggesting significant negative selection into violent 
relationships.   
While these data represent the universe of California births, they exclude women 
who miscarried or aborted.  How this might bias estimated effects depends on from what 
part of the distribution we believe these women are drawn.  One might reasonably argue 
that these women suffer (or expect to suffer) the most extreme violence and the worst 
birth outcomes, suggesting that estimates that exclude these women will be biased 
downward.   
 
D. Empirical Estimation Strategy and Results  
To estimate the impact of violence on birth outcomes, I first estimate probit 
models of the impact of admission to the hospital for an assault on the probability a child 
is born LBW including controls for maternal background.  This is followed by propensity 
score matching estimates and bivariate probit estimates that account for the non-random 
selection into violent relationships. 
The probit model of the impact of violence on the probability a child is born LBW 
is as follows: let the indicator LBWi=1 if mother I gives birth to a LBW infant and 
LBWi=0 otherwise.  The birth production function is described by the latent variable 
model: 
LBWi
* = βXi  + δVi  + εi 
Where LBWi
* is the underlying health of the child,  Xi is a vector of individual maternal 
characteristics and Vi is an indicator for whether the birth mother was admitted to the   28
hospital for assault while pregnant.  The probability that a baby is born LBW is Prob 
[LBWi=1]= Φ [βXi  + δVi ] where Φ is a standard normal cdf.  
In Table 8 column (1) and (2) are probit estimates and marginal effects of the 
impact of assault on LBW.
17  Women who are assaulted are 3.7 percent more likely to 
have a LBW infant.  This effect is considerably larger than that of other maternal 
characteristics that have been shown to affect birth outcomes (such as poverty and 
maternal education) with the exception of being black which has roughly the same 
negative impact on birth weight as assault.   
 For the propensity score/matching estimator, I match women who were assaulted 
with women who were not based on propensity score methods.
18   The estimates derived 
from propensity score matching methods suggest that women who are the victim of 
violence are 8.5 percent more likely to have a LBW birth relative to similar women who 
have not been assaulted and their babies weigh on average 180 grams less. The estimates 
are significant at the 1 percent level.  That this estimated effect is larger than the effect 
based on the probit model is attributable to the weighting scheme employed in matching: 
women most likely to be assaulted (ie, have the highest propensity score) receive a higher 
weight in the matching estimate.   Figure 2 which displays matching estimates of the 
impact of assault on LBW by propensity score illustrates this point.   The estimated 
impact of assault is much higher for women with higher propensity scores – as high as 22 
percent.  If estimates based on these women receive greater weight in the matching 
estimator, then this would explain the source of difference in the probit and matching 
estimates.  One can argue that an estimate that reflects the impact of violence on birth 
                                                 
17 Estimates of the impact of violence on infant mortality were positive but not significant.  
18 I estimated the probability of assault (propensity score) based on all control variables included in Table 
12, then matched women who were assaulted with those who were not with a very similar propensity score 
(within the same bin – for 150 bins). Matching was done without replacement and the matching estimator 
was weighted by the propensity score.    29
outcomes for those most likely to be the victim of violence is more useful than one that 
gives equal weight to women at very low risk of abuse.   
As a final estimation strategy, I estimate the impact of assault on the probability 
of LBW using a bivariate probit model.  In this model, the birth production function is 
described by the latent variable model as before, but now suppose that the process by 
which women are hospitalized for an assault is described by the latent variable model: 
Vi*=  τXi + γZcry-1 + μi   
where Vi* is the amount of violence, Xi is a vector of individual characteristics and Zcry-1 
is a variable not contained in Xi that affects violence against women.  To allow for the 
possibility that the unobserved determinants of birthweight are correlated with 
unobserved determinants of violence, assume that E[εi] = E[μi] = 0, var [εi] = var [μi] = 1 
and cov[εi, μi] = ρ.  The instrument for violence in this case (Zcry-1 ) is a measure of the 
strictness of prosecutorial policies towards domestic violence in the previous year and is 
defined at the county-year-race level.  In California, as elsewhere, laws regarding the 
prosecution of domestic violence are determined at the state level.  However, prosecution 
of domestic violence falls to the local (county) prosecutors offices.  Local county 
prosecutors in California have wide discretion over the prosecution of spousal assault.  
They vary in terms of whether they have separate offices/prosecutors who specialize in 
domestic violence, the amount of training their prosecutors receive and the presence of 
advocates assigned to women bringing charges.  Unfortunately, data on police and 
prosecutorial policies are not available on a consistent basis.
19  Instead, I proxy for 
prosecutorial policies by calculating the proportion of all men arrested for domestic 
violence who are sentenced to jail for each race in each county and year. If either the 
                                                 
19 Data on such policies are only available for the 7 largest counties in California and only up until 1996.   30
deterrent or incapacitation effects of incarceration are strong (Levitt, 1996), the 
proportion of offenders who go to jail in the previous year (referred to here as the lagged 
incarceration rate) may serve as an appropriate instrument for the level of violence 
witnessed today: as the incarceration rate in the previous period increases, violence 
should decline.  
Table 8 columns 3-5 contain coefficient estimates and marginal effects from the 
bivariate probit model. In column (3) are estimates of the impact of violence on the 
probability LBW, column (4) contains the marginal effects and in column (5) are 
coefficient estimates of the determinants of violence. Increasing the percentage of men 
who go the jail for domestic violence conditional on arrest for domestic violence 
significantly decreases the probability that a pregnant woman will be admitted to the 
hospital for an assault in the next year. Over this period, the incarceration rate increased 
from 20 percent to 74 percent.  An increase of this magnitude leads to a very small (2 
percent) decline in the probability of assault on average, a point to which I return.  
Based on estimates from the bivariate probit, women who are admitted to the 
hospital for an assault face an 18 percent increase in the probability of LBW birth – a 
considerably larger effect than was found via probit and also larger than estimates from 
the matching/propensity score methods.  To understand this discrepancy, I examine 
whether there is heterogeneity in the effect of the lagged incarceration rate (Zcry-1) on 
violence. In figure 3 are coefficient estimates of the impact of Zcry-1 on whether the 
woman was hospitalized for assault by propensity score.  It appears that the lagged 
incarceration rate is most negatively related to assault among those with the highest 
propensity score for assault. We know from Figure 2 that the impact of assault on 
birthweight is likewise higher among those with the highest propensity score, suggesting   31
that a local average treatment effects (LATE) interpretation can explain the increase in 
magnitude of the bivariate probit estimates over the probit and propensity matching score 
estimates.   In sum, the results presented here suggest that assault during pregnancy leads 
to an increase in the probability of a low birth weight birth of 4 to 18 percent.  This range 
reflects considerable heterogeneity in the impact with the children of those women most 
disadvantaged and most likely to be the victim of violence suffering the most.      
 
VI. Conclusion 
Over the past fifteen years, violence against women has declined as their employment 
and earnings have increased.  A model of household bargaining that incorporates 
violence is consistent with these trends.  I find empirical support for a causal relationship 
between labor market conditions for women and violence using both individual survey 
data and administrative data: recent improvements in labor market conditions for women 
relative to men have led to a ten percent reduction in violence against them.   This finding 
suggests that in addition to more equitable redistribution of resources, policies that serve 
to narrow the male-female wage gap also reduce violence and the costs associated with it.  
The estimates imply that if women were equally represented in high wage industries 
erasing this source of the wage gap, violence against them would decline by an additional 
16 percent.  
Based on this finding, I revisit previous work establishing a positive relationship 
between women’s share of household resources and child health and well-being.  While 
previous work has largely assumed that this relationship is attributable to increases in 
women’s material investment in children, I provide evidence that a reduction in violence, 
at least in the case of birth weight, is also an important determinant.  These results   32
suggest that in addition to addressing concerns of equity, improved pay parity can have 
positive effects on the health of American women as well as important intergenerational 
effects.    
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Appendix I: A Model of Household Bargaining with Violence 
  In this appendix I develop a simple model of household bargaining that 
incorporates violence and shows under what assumptions an increase in women’s relative 
income leads to a decline in violence.  
 Let  Uw (Cw, S) be a woman’s utility which is increasing in her own consumption 
(Cw) and increasing in safety (S) and let Um (Cm, V) be a man’s utility which is increasing 
in his own consumption (Cw) and in violence (V).  Assume that there is an upper bound to 
violence (death)  V  and S= V – V.    Both utility functions are assumed to be strictly 
concave, monotonically increasing, differentiable and homothetic.  I is total household 
income and α is the share of income a woman would get if she were not in the 
partnership. To focus on partnerships that will experience some violence, assume that the 
marginal rate of substitution between consumption and violence is greater for women 
than men where V=0 (MRSm ((1- α)I, 0) < MRSw (αI, V )).  We denote as T the set of 
feasible utility pairs (Um, Uw) that the partners may obtain if they reach an agreement and 
the utility each gets from dissolution of the partnership (the disagreement payoff or single 
state utility) as (dm, dw) = (Um(1-α)I, 0), Uw (αI, V ) .    
I first show that the domestic violence problem constitutes a Nash bargaining 
problem and that a Nash bargaining solution provides a unique solution to the problem.  
Lemma 1: Under the above assumptions, the problem is a Nash bargaining problem with 
a Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1950). 
Proof: 
The following necessary and sufficient conditions are met: 
1) The set T is compact.  This is satisfied since the set of feasible allocations is compact 
and Um and Uw are continuous.    37
2) The set T is convex.  This is satisfied since the set of feasible allocations is convex and 
Um and Uw are continuous.  
3) d= (Um((1- α)I, 0), Uw (αI, V )) is a member of T. 
4) For some member (Um, Uw) of T it is the case that Um>dm  and Uw>dw.  This holds 
under the assumption that MRSm ((1- α)I, 0) < MRSw (αI, V ). ▄ 
To allow for different degrees of bargaining power between partners, we will use Kalai’s 
asymmetric Nash bargaining solution. The solution to the asymmetric bargaining 




subject to (Um, Uw) ≥ (dm, dw) and (Um, Uw) feasible, where τ is a measure of bargaining 
power of the man.  
I study next how an increase in the relative wage of women affects utilities of both men 
and women.  
Lemma 2: An increase in α results in an increase in U*w and a decrease in U*m.  
 Proof:  
Take α and α’ such that  α'> α .  Then dw(α’)> dw(α) and dm(α’)< dm(α).  Therefore,  
) 1 ( τ
τ
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and by convexity of T we have that U*w (α’)≥ U*m (α). ▄ 
 
This alone does not guarantee that an increase in α results in a decline in violence. This 
depends on the shape of the contract curve.  
Lemma 3: the contract curve has a positive slope.  
Proof:    38
Let (Cm, V) and (Cm’, V’) be points on the contract curve such that Cm’> Cm  and  V’ < V. 
By definition, MRSm(C, V)  = MRSw(C,  V − V ) since (Cm,V) is a point on the contract 
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By homotheticity and strict concavity of utility functions,  MRSm(C’m, V’) < MRSm (Cm, 
V) and  
MRSw(C’m,  V − V ’) > MRSw (Cm,V).  This implies that MRSw (C’,  V − V ’) > MRSm (C’, 
V’) and the point (C’m, V’) cannot be on the contract curve. ▄ 
 
Theorem 1: An increase in α results in a decrease in violence.  
Proof: 
Take α and α’ such that α'> α .    
Then U*w(α’) > U*w(α), by lemma 2, which implies that V(α’) < V(α), since the contract 
curve has a positive slope by lemma 3.▄ 
 
The above simple model of household bargaining shows that under certain reasonable 
assumptions (namely strict concavity, differentiability and homotheticity of utility 
functions) an increase in a woman’s income leads to a decline in violence against her.
20    
 
                                                 
20 Incorporating the marriage market should not affect this comparative static result.  Rather, the marriage 
market simply influences the disagreement payoff (d) which will become the maximum of an individual’s 
single state utility and the expected utility from another match.  In this paper I do not focus on the marriage 
market because there is no data for California on marriages and divorces.  Coefficient Marginal Effect Coefficient Marginal Effect
Annual Personal Income/10000 -0.010 -0.001 -0.108 -0.011
[-1.93] [-1.77]
White -0.300 -0.028 -0.145 -0.015
[-3.39] [-1.15]
Black -0.133 -0.011 -0.041 -0.004
[-1.25] [-0.30]
Hispanic -0.256 -0.021 -0.119 -0.012
[-2.84] [-0.97]
Asian -0.482 -0.031 -0.314 -0.025
[-4.35] [-2.12]
<HS 0.124 0.012 0.043 0.004
[2.58] [0.65]
HS 0.088 0.008 -0.012 -0.001
[2.27] [-0.18]
Age <=25 0.788 0.115 0.639 0.093
[12.35] [4.74]
Age 25-30 0.724 0.103 0.656 0.097
[10.92] [7.25]
Age 31-39 0.580 0.067 0.516 0.064
[9.26] [6.75]
Age 40-49 0.370 0.039 0.334 0.039
[5.85] [5.06]
Age 50-64 0.018 0.002 0.011 0.001
[1.35] [0.78]
1999 0.062 0.006 -0.028 -0.003
[1.23] [-0.64]
2000 -0.019 -0.002 0.017 0.002
[-0.36] [0.30]
2001 -0.072 -0.006 0.092 0.010
[-1.34] [1.11]
2002 -0.527 -0.036 0.072 0.008
[-8.21] [0.50]
2003 -0.142 -0.012 0.094 0.010
[-2.63] [1.23]
Los Angeles -0.056 -0.005 0.026 0.003
[-1.40] [0.26]
San Diego 0.012 0.001 0.043 0.004
[0.22] [0.83]
Alameda 0.049 0.005 0.010 0.001
[0.62] [0.19]
San Francisco -0.018 -0.002 -0.199 -0.018
[-0.14] [-1.99]
Sacramento 0.100 0.010 -0.643 -0.047
[1.29] [-7.65]





Z statistics in brackets below coefficient estimates 
Probit IV Probit
Table 1: Probit and IV Probit Estimates and Marginal Effects: Impact of Women's Income on 
Probability of Domestic Violence in Past yearTable 2: First Stage Estimates of Impact of Female Labor Market Conditions 

















































Z statistics in brackets below coefficient estimates 
on Women's Annual Income - CWHS(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Female assaults Female Assaults/ Female Assaults/ (Fem Assault/Injuries)/ Female/
Wage Ratio Total Injuries Total Injuries (Male Assault/Injuries) Male Assaults
Female/Male Wage  -28.431 -0.0339 -0.0208 -0.1729 -0.1705
[9.1036] [0.0093] [0.0089] [0.0496] [0.0491]
Male Assaults 0.1218
[0.0156]
Female/Male Non Assaults 0.0575
[0.0286]
Black 47.5185 0.063 0.0438 0.0777 0.0739
[4.5636] [0.0046] [0.0046] [0.0179] [0.0183]
Hispanic -9.6552 0.0161 0.0014 -0.1067 -0.0959
[1.6139] [0.0015] [0.0023] [0.0076] [0.0085]
Asian -8.8909 0.0019 -0.0036 0.0096 -0.0142
[0.6324] [0.0015] [0.0015] [0.0136] [0.0123]
Ln(per capita income) -5.8704 0.0101 0.008 -0.0948 -0.079
[10.0347] [0.0102] [0.0097] [0.0527] [0.0521]
non-intimate homicide rate 93,127.69 85.2876 61.6599 -66.5776 -68.0813
[9,852.7269] [8.9150] [7.9142] [22.4166] [22.5438]
unemployment rate -36.6822 -0.0595 -0.0562 0.1497 0.0932
[40.6674] [0.0494] [0.0479] [0.4162] [0.4213]
Ln(immigration) 4.6829 0.0071 0.0064 -0.0096 -0.0088
[1.9165] [0.0022] [0.0021] [0.0156] [0.0155]
Observations 2261 2261 2261 1865 1853
R-squared 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.25 0.26
Ln(wage ratio)
ln(female wage/male wage) -22.9341 -0.0293 -0.0179 -0.1492 -0.1481
[7.5461] [0.0080] [0.0077] [0.0428] [0.0423]
Male Assaults 0.1217
[0.0155]
Observations 2229 2229 2229 1861 1851
R-squared 0.74 0.78 0.79 0.25 0.26
Linear difference of wages
Male wage-female wage 0.0407 0.0001 0.0001 0.0007 0.0007
[0.0351] [0.0000] [0.0000] [0.0002] [0.0002]
Male Assaults 0.1232
[0.0156]
Observations 2261 2261 2261 1865 1853
R-squared 0.77 0.78 0.79 0.25 0.26
Each observation is a county-year-race cell.
All regressions include county and  year dummy variables.  All regressions weighted by population.  
Robust standard errors clustered on county. 
Table 4: Estimates of the Impact of Labor Market Conditions on ViolenceLn(female Assaults) Ln(Male Assaults) Ln(Female Assaults)




Black 1.5026 1.3507 1.1918
[0.1119] [0.0806] [0.1304]
Hispanic 0.4359 1.2056 0.0231
[0.0736] [0.0570] [0.1021]
Asian 0.094 0.8319 0.0082
[0.1271] [0.0966] [0.1196]
Ln(per capita income) 0.0344 0.0165 -0.049
[0.2848] [0.1637] [0.2776]
non-intimate homicide rate 545.6678 617.4327 215.9786
[105.5956] [86.4992] [97.6656]
unemployment rate 0.4021 -0.7642 0.9405
[1.4372] [0.9887] [1.4140]
Ln(immigration) -0.0382 -0.0175 -0.0359
[0.0647] [0.0433] [0.0625]
nonratio -0.2855 0.1906 -0.1689
[0.1691] [0.1283] [0.1383]
ln(population) 0.14 -0.2659 0.1842
[0.0842] [0.0648] [0.0777]
ln(non-assault injuries) 0.8921 1.3436 0.5259
[0.0806] [0.0701] [0.1049]
Observations 965 1060 963
R-squared 0.96 0.98 0.96
Robust standard errors in brackets
Each observation is a county-year-race cell.
All regressions include county and  year dummy variables.  All regressions weighted by population.  
Robust standard errors clustered on county. 
Table 4A: Estimates of the Impact of Labor Market Conditions on Assaults - Natural Logsfemale wage/male wage -0.056
[0.027]
ln(female wage/male wage) -0.047
[0.024]
Male wage-female wage 0.00023
[0.00014]
Female/Male Non Assault Injuries 0.008 0.008 0.008
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002]
Black -0.06 -0.061 -0.06
[0.010] [0.009] [0.010]
Hispanic -0.077 -0.077 -0.076
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006]
Asian -0.118 -0.118 -0.115
[0.007] [0.007] [0.008]
Ln(per capita income) -0.019 -0.02 -0.024
[0.042] [0.042] [0.041]
non-intimate homicide rate 78.105 78.494 79.581
[16.720] [16.713] [16.703]
unemployment rate 0.159 0.16 0.159
[0.345] [0.345] [0.345]
Ln(immigration) 0.002 0.002 0.001
[0.012] [0.012] [0.012]
Observations 55074 55064 55074
R-squared 0.08 0.08 0.08
Robust standard errors in brackets
Each observation is a zipcode-race-year cell.  Regressions weighted by number of total hospitalizations
in each cell. 
Note: zipcode fixed effects included; only years 1991 and 1994-2000 included in this analysis due
to lack of 5 digit zipcode in years 1990, 1992-1993 and 2001-2003
Table 4B: Impact of Relative Wages on Ratio of Female to Male Assaults - zipcode level(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Female assaults Female Assaults/ Female Assaults/ (Fem Assault/Injuries)/ Ln(Female Assaults) Ln(Female Assaults)
Total Injuries Total Injuries (Male Assault/Injuries)
Female/Male Wage  (State wages) -36.6386 -0.0398 -0.023 -0.2444 -1.4714 -1.1246
[14.6451] [0.0125] [0.0121] [0.0605] [0.3820] [0.3804]
Black 47.8359 0.064 0.044 0.0822 1.288 0.4275
[4.6510] [0.0047] [0.0047] [0.0185] [0.1297] [0.0738]
Hispanic -10.4105 0.0141 -0.0009 -0.1035 0.0916 -0.2234
[2.0428] [0.0018] [0.0025] [0.0092] [0.0959] [0.0708]
Asian -9.376 0.0053 -0.0005 -0.014 0.2287 -0.2418
[0.7604] [0.0018] [0.0019] [0.0126] [0.1139] [0.0663]
Ln(per capita income) -7.2764 0.0062 0.0049 -0.1027 -0.0909 0.1155
[10.2762] [0.0101] [0.0096] [0.0545] [0.2721] [0.2594]
non-intimate homicide rate 92,845 84.9313 60.3631 -75.9704 166.7073 92.7411
[9,882] [9.0958] [8.0349] [22.7912] [95.8800] [91.2645]
unemployment rate -43.7775 -0.0616 -0.0528 0.0451 0.6365 1.8124
[39.6944] [0.0478] [0.0465] [0.4458] [1.3561] [1.5451]
Ln(immigration) 4.9527 0.0075 0.0066 -0.0075 -0.0274 -0.0266
[1.9767] [0.0023] [0.0021] [0.0164] [0.0619] [0.0640]
Non assault injuries female/Non Assault inju 1.5232 -0.007 -0.0072 0.0611 0.0993 -0.696
[1.1165] [0.0025] [0.0030] [0.0302] [0.2207] [0.2652]
Male Assaults/total injuries 0.1266
[0.0158]




ln (non assault injuries female)/ ln (non assault injuries male) 1.5895
[0.2101]
Observations 2118 2118 2118 1853 963 963
R-squared 0.74 0.79 0.8 0.26 0.96 0.6
Robust standard errors in brackets
Table 5: Estimates of the Impact of Labor Market Conditions on Violence - Alternative Measure of  WageWeekend Weekday Weekend Weekday
Relative Wage -0.137 -0.056 0.0006 0.0002
[0.060] [0.018] [0.000] [0.000]
Black 0.15 0.132 0.153 0.132
[0.014] [0.006] [0.016] [0.006]
Hispanic 0.035 0.026 0.038 0.027
[0.009] [0.004] [0.010] [0.005]
asian 0.095 0.05 0.105 0.054
[0.029] [0.009] [0.028] [0.009]
Ln(per capita income) -0.093 -0.116 -0.059 -0.007
[0.048] [0.021] [0.130] [0.036]
ln(non-intimate homicide) 0.014 0.004 0.013 0.003
[0.005] [0.002] [0.004] [0.002]
unemployment rate -0.36 0.056 -2.695 0.042
[0.208] [0.054] [0.732] [0.151]
Ln(immigration) 0.009 0.01 -0.007 0.007
[0.010] [0.004] [0.012] [0.004]
Ln(incarceration) 0.002 0.006 0.003 0.007
[0.010] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002]
Observations 718 816 718 816
R-squared 0.38 0.78 0.4 0.78
Robust standard errors in brackets
Table 6: Estimates of Impact of Labor Market Conditons on Female Assaults/Female Injuries
Weekend vs. Weekday Admissions
Female Wage/Male Wage Male Wage-Female WageNo assault Assault Unintentional Injury Car Crash
Birth outcomes
LBW 0.064 0.149 0.101 0.080
Fetal Death 0.006 0.010 0.005 0.004
Infant death 0.006 0.012 0.011 0.008
Pregnancy
Drug use 0.001 0.009 0.004 0.001
Tobacco 0.020 0.081 0.046 0.037
Bleeding 0.005 0.009 0.006 0.010
Maternal Characteristics
Teenage 0.12 0.22 0.13 0.16
Over 35 years old 0.10 0.05 0.10 0.08
<HS 0.34 0.44 0.31 0.28
HS 0.30 0.37 0.35 0.38
Some college 0.19 0.14 0.21 0.22
College 0.17 0.05 0.12 0.12
Medicaid 0.43 0.70 0.52 0.48
Black 0.08 0.43 0.19 0.17
White 0.91 0.56 0.81 0.82
Hispanic 0.53 0.34 0.39 0.43
Paternal Characteristics
Black 0.08 0.40 0.18 0.18
Hispanic 0.54 0.45 0.44 0.45
White 0.36 0.14 0.35 0.35
<HS 0.30 0.28 0.22 0.21
HS 0.30 0.39 0.38 0.38
Some college 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.17
College grad 0.17 0.03 0.12 0.13
Observations 5397529 1656 3699 5270
Table 7: Birth Outcomes and Maternal/Paternal Characteristics LBW Marginal Effects LBW Marginal Effects Prenatal Assault
Prenatal Assault 0.267 0.037 0.879 0.183
[0.040] [0.535]
Lagged Incarceration Rate -0.01
[0.005]
Medicaid 0.002 0.000 0.002 0.000 0.169
[0.002] [0.002] [0.018]
Black 0.263 0.036 0.262 0.035 0.25
[0.013] [0.013] [0.094]
White -0.093 -0.011 -0.094 -0.011 -0.122
[0.012] [0.012] [0.089]
Single 0.026 0.003 0.026 0.003 0.209
[0.003] [0.003] [0.021]
Over 35 years old 0.191 0.025 0.191 0.025 -0.05
[0.003] [0.003] [0.033]
Teenage 0.096 0.011 0.096 0.011 0.01
[0.003] [0.003] [0.020]
<HS 0.024 0.003 0.024 0.003 0.08
[0.003] [0.003] [0.027]
HS graduate 0.021 0.002 0.021 0.002 0.042
[0.003] [0.003] [0.024]
Male child -0.049 -0.006 -0.049 -0.006 0.011
[0.002] [0.002] [0.015]
Twin birth 1.649 0.459 1.649 0.459 0.012
[0.004] [0.004] [0.046]
Father Black 0.049 0.006 0.049 0.006 0.114
[0.009] [0.009] [0.067]
Father White -0.037 -0.004 -0.036 -0.004 -0.067
[0.008] [0.008] [0.064]
Father Hispanic -0.042 -0.005 -0.041 -0.005 -0.106
[0.008] [0.008] [0.062]
Father <HS 0.116 0.014 0.116 0.014 0.159
[0.005] [0.005] [0.050]
Father HS 0.108 0.013 0.108 0.013 0.176
[0.004] [0.004] [0.047]
Father some college 0.05 0.006 0.05 0.006 0.077
[0.005] [0.005] [0.050]
Father information missing 0.232 0.031 0.232 0.031 0.373
[0.005] [0.006] [0.051]
county unemployment rate 0.087 0.010 0.085 0.010 -1.008
[0.043] [0.043] [0.357]
Real percapita income -0.04 -0.005 -0.04 -0.005 -0.118
[0.004] [0.004] [0.034]
Observations 4481243 4468224 4468224
Robust standard errors in brackets
Table 8 Impact of Prenatal Assault on LBW: Probit and Bivariate Probit Estimates 
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Figure 3 First Stage Estimates of Impact of Incarceration Rate on Assault
ﬁMean
Any domestic violence 0.053
Annual Personal Income of Women 29881
[30886]










<25 years old 0.140
25-30 years old 0.129
31-39 years old 0.267
40-49 years old 0.251
50-64 years old 0.213












Other race 0.065 17281
<HS 0.072 24862
HS 0.063 23905
Some College 0.058 27354
College 0.029 39749
<25 years old 0.092 19306
25-30 years old 0.082 28767
31-39 years old 0.062 29798
40-49 years old 0.038 33174





            
            
Appendix Table 1: Descriptive Statistics California Women's Health Survey (CWHS)
Sample Averages: CWHS 1998-2003
Probability of Violence and Average Income by Race, Education, Age and Marital StatusAll White Black Hispanic
Wages, Employment 
Female Weekly Wage 217 241 226 187
Male Weekly Wage 260 279 246 251
Unemployment rate 0.073
Ln(per capita income) 10.11
Violence (per 100,000)
Female Assaults  20.3 10.6 99.3 16.8
Female non-Assault Injuries 450
Arrests 692 446 1700 841
Non Intimate Homicides 2.16 1.97 4.97 1.8
Car Crashes 113 125 140 88
Female Assaults - Older 7.1 5.6 23.6 6.3
Male Assaults 153 62 574 197
Male non-Assault Injuries 628
Lagged incarceration rate 0.37 0.292 0.311 0.502
by Race
Appendix table 2: California Hospitalization & Employment Data Sample MeansAppendix Figure 1:
Share of Women Across Industries - 1990 and 2000
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